In the general election, a number of landmarks lead the way to Election Day: the traditional Labor Day kick-off, the ad campaign, September debate negotiations, the debates themselves, and a grueling last ditch effort as the candidates go all out to win over a few more voters in key states. Charges and countercharges fly; excitement builds. While all this is happening, the campaigns are operating with one goal in mind: 270. Two hundred-and-seventy electoral votes is the number needed to win, and major party presidential campaigns deploy their resources accordingly.
Contrasting Visions or Chasing Dollars and
Trivial Pursuit?
Ideally the general election campaign would provide a stage for discussion of the major challenges facing the country and for presentation of competing approaches and ideas for addressing those challenges. The candidates would set out their priorities and give a sense of how they would govern. An effective general election campaign not only gets the candidate elected, but sets him or her on a path to governing.
In reality, however, the fall campaign is
oftentimes not particularly edifying. First of all,
the candidates do spend quite a bit of time
fundraising. Secondly, it is a lot easier to resort to
familiar bromides than to address complicated issues such as
the national debt (+),
entitlement reform or income stagnation. Much
attention in the general election is devoted to defining the
opponent in unfavorable terms. Charges and
countercharges fly. Seemingly trivial episodes,
incidents and gaffes are elevated by the campaigns and the
media, while major issues go unaddressed.
2020 General Election
Campaign
One could argue that President Trump started
running for re-election the day he was inaugurated.
His campaign had the advantage of not having gone through
divisive primaries, while the Democratic challenger Biden
had to retool his campaign from primary to general election
mode. In a real sense, the general election campaign
began once it was clear Biden would be the nominee.
Having garnered enough delegates to secure the nomination,
Biden, as the presumptive nominee, turned his attention to
the goal of obtaining 270 electoral votes in November.
The Democratic campaign added staff and advisors, placed a
few top people at the DNC and built out organizations in key
states. Generally major party nominees move toward the
middle, toning down more extreme elements of their messages,
but Biden did reach out to Sanders. The pandemic
adjusted national conventions in August made the nominations
official, but, by most accounts provided minimal "bounce"
for the respective tickets. The third party and
independent candidates, mostly not well known, appear
unlikely to affect the outcome. In summer some
attention focused on rapper Kanye West, running with backing
from Republicans, but he only managed to get on the ballot
in 12 states.
COVID-19 complicated matters for the Trump
campaign, which was all set to highlight the strong economy;
but instead had to tout the "Great American Comeback."
Republicans portrayed Biden as weak and out of it, a puppet
of the radical left, who was weak on law and order, wanted
to raise taxes and open the borders, and would lead to
socialism. They argued that he had accomplished little
in his 47 years of service. The Trump campaign and its
allies also sought to tar Biden with scandal by making a
major issue of Hunter Biden (1,
2,
3,
4);
the tack seemed ineffective in view of the major issues
facing the country.
The pandemic helped Biden by enabling him to
keep a low profile, participate in carefully orchestrated
events, and avoid gaffes. Biden's main theme was the
need to "Build Back Better;" he also continued his message
that the soul of America was at stake in this
election. Experience and empathy were key parts of
Biden's appeal. Biden and the Democrats focused
heavily on arguments that Trump had botched the response to
the pandemic, costing thousands of lives.
Biden consistently led in national polls, and
through October poll after poll from battleground states
showed Biden ahead, sometimes within the margin of error but
consistently ahead. However, the presidential race is
effectively a series of state based campaigns. Whereas
in 2016 late deciding voters tipped the race to Trump, in
2020 the pool of persuadable voters was quite small.
Still there remained the possibility that the polls were
missing "shy Trump voters." The Trump campaign
expressed confidence in its internal polling and emphasized
that it had many pathways to 270. Indeed in a Sept. 8
conference call the campaign presented seven different
scenarios to achieve 270. In particular, the Trump
campaign hoped to replicate the formula which helped it pull
upsets in states such as Wisconsin and Pennsylvania in 2016:
win the vast majority of the smallest (population) counties.
Trump campaign kept up a very active schedule of campaign travel by the principals and surrogates, including airport rallies by Trump, Trump family member events, surrogate bus tours, busy field offices and people out knocking on doors. This approach carried risks and drew criticism (+).
The Biden campaign strategy of sticking to
largely virtual events was something of an experiment in
real time and could have been very risky. Rallies,
office openings and other events are the batteries that
energize a campaign. Having volunteers go door to door
and engage voters in face-to-face interactions is proven to
be one of the most effective things a campaign can do.
None of this can be replicated online. Biden himself
led a cloistered existence for the first six months of the
pandemic, consisting largely of virtual events and remarks
read from teleprompters. The campaign adhered to the
virtual approach through September. In September Biden
started to travel more, but doing only tightly controlled
events. Many of these were strange, artificial,
pseudo-events where Biden or the other principals spoke to
small numbers of participants socially distanced in circles
in parking lots. The Democrats also did many drive-in
rallies. In early October the Democrats began some
canvassing in battleground states (>).
The debates were consequential. There were concerns among Democrats about Biden's functioning and how he would perform in unscripted situations such as the presidential debates. In fact however, it was Trump who had a costly debate. His constant interruptions in the first debate may have played well with his base, but did not help him win over other voters. Then the second debate was cancelled. Trump came across as much more measured in the final debate, but by then tens of millions of people had already voted.
Trump did have the power of the
presidency. Policy meshed right in with the
campaign. For example in July the administration
rescinded the Obama administration's Affirmatively
Furthering Fair Housing rule, seeking to appeal to suburban
voters. On Sept. 8 Trump traveled to Jupiter, Florida
to deliver "remarks on environmental accomplishments for the
people of Florida" and he signed a presidential memorandum
protecting offshore areas from oil leasing. On Sept.
13 he signed an executive order "lowering drug prices by
putting America first." On Sept. 15 he presided over
the signing of a peace agreement between Israel and the UAE
at the White House. On Sept.
18 announced billions in aid to Puerto Rico, which he had
earlier opposed. Trump held regular press conferences
during which he could further drive home his message.
At many of his airport rallies, Air Force One, a symbol of
the presidency, was prominent in the background.
There were, inevitably, Trump controversies;
it was almost as if the "chickens were coming home to
roost." For example, September opened with the rumor
that Trump's unannounced visit to Walter Reed Medical Center
in November was due to "mini-strokes." A few days
later the Sept. 3 story in The Atlantic by Jeffrey
Goldberg "Trump: Americans Who Died in War Are 'Losers' and
'Suckers'" generated a lot of controversy. The next
tempest came when excerpts from Bob Woodward's book Rage
indicated that Trump had downplayed the seriousness of the
pandemic. Closing out the month the New York Times
obtained Trump's long-withheld tax returns and on Sept. 27
reported he paid no federal taxes in 11 of 18 years and just
$750 in 2016, while claiming huge losses. Trump
routinely dismissed these reports as "fake news."
Around Labor Day there were reports that the
Trump campaign was running low on money, and that Trump
might even put a significant sum of his own money into the
campaign. The Biden campaign raised a record amounts
and was vastly outspending the Trump campaign on TV
advertising. In a Sept. conference call, Trump
campaign manager Bill Stepien said the campaign's spending
on advertising was "nimble and agile" and also pointed to
the campaign's early investments in the states, something
that could not be duplicated in just eight weeks leading up
to Election Day.
Outside groups worked to influence the outcome. Some of Trump's allies were critical that the pro-Trump super PACs did not do enough. On Aug. 31, Politico reported on a "massive" super PAC effort, Preserve America PAC, led by Chris LaCivita (of Swift Boat Veterans for Truth fame from 2004) and funded by casino magnate Sheldon Adelson and Home Depot co-founder Bernie Marcus. In September former NYC Mayor Mike Bloomberg made it known that he had decided to concentrate his efforts on Florida, planning to spend $100 million to tip the state to Biden. Activity by Republicans opposed to Trump was fascinating to watch and seemingly very effective. The Lincoln Project has led on searing messages portraying Trump as unfit and a danger to our democracy. Defending Democracy Together, led by six prominent conservatives including Bill Kristol, has a number of projects, including Republican Voters Against Trump. There were myriad examples disenchanted former Trump supporters as well as Republicans who served in previous administrations who backed Biden.
In a campaign there is always the possibility
of an October surprise, a late-breaking development that
shakes up the race. For the 2020 campaign, there were
two late developments. The death of Supreme Court
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Sept. 18 came as a
shock. Trump quickly nominated Judge Amy Coney
Barrett. Republicans hoped the nomination would
galvanize supporters (+),
while Democrats emphasized the threat the posed to the
Affordable Care Act if she were confirmed (+).
Hearings started on Oct. 12 and on Oct. 26 the Senate
confirmed Barrett without a single Democratic vote, just
eight days before Election Day. It was a major
conservative win at the cost of a further ratcheting up of
partisan acrimony (+).
President Trump's positive test for COVID at the beginning
of October provided a second big shock. Trump was
potentially at dire risk, and he did spend three days in the
hospital but by Oct. 12 he was back on the campaign trail (+).
Many times throughout the fall campaign
President Trump sought to raise doubts about the integrity
of the election. Hundreds of lawsuits were contested
around the country throughout the summer and fall.
Republicans argued for strict interpretation of election law
in state after state, on everything from drop boxes to
ballot received by deadlines, while Democrats sought to
relax rules on in view of the pandemic. Despite
Biden's consistent lead in polls, the country headed into
November 3 amid uncertainty and worries about possible
unrest.
Record numbers of Americans cast their
ballots before Election Day as COVID prompted a major shift
toward mail (+)
and early in person voting. By Oct. 31, the U.S.
Elections Project reported an astounding 90.4 million people
had already voted.
The pandemic did not disappear. Trump
put a major focus on developing a vaccine through "Operation
Warp Speed." It seemed extremely unlikely that a
vaccine could be developed and introduced before Election
Day, but Trump said repeatedly that a vaccine was very close
(+).
On Sept. 22, 2020, the U.S. hit the milestone of 200,000
lives lost due to COVID-19. In Sept. 26 the U.S. reached
eight million cases, on Oct. 16 eight million cases and on
Oct. 29 nine million. In the week before Election Day,
even as cases reached record levels, Trump maintained the
U.S. was "rounding the corner."
Battleground/Swing States and Other States
A campaign must determine how best to spend
the resources it has available; these include staff,
advertising, and candidate and surrogate visits. In
some states the campaign will "play hard" or even "play very
hard." These contested states receive frequent visits
by the candidate, his or her spouse, the vice presidential
candidate, and surrogates, and the campaign makes serious ad
buys in them. At the other extreme, some states are
essentially written off as unwinnable; they receive minimal
resources. A battleground state is one in which both
campaigns are investing significant resources (staff,
candidate and surrogate visits and advertising). As
noted above, in the Fall the Trump campaign maintained an
active travel schedule; candidates and surrogates, did many
rallies and events in battleground states despite the
pandemic. The Biden campaign did much fewer tightly
constrained pseudo-events with small numbers of
participants.
The list of battleground states can vary
over time and depending upon to whom one is talking.
Recent campaigns have revolved around about nine or ten
battleground states. The 2020 map started with the
closest states from 2016. Trump carried four of the
five closest states, all big ones: Michigan (0.3%),
Wisconsin (1%), Pennsylvania (1.2%) and Florida (1.2%),
while Clinton squeaked out a win in New Hampshire
(0.4%). As the weeks progress, campaigns may upgrade
or downgrade a state's importance as it becomes more or less
competitive. For example, the Trump campaign realized
relatively early on that Colorado was going to be a
difficult state to win; it put little into advertising there
and the Biden campaign followed; from the Biden campaign's
viewpoint it was "safe battleground" state. Virginia
too leaned strongly toward the Democrats while Iowa, Ohio
and Texas leaned to the Republicans. A campaign needs
to have devised several "paths to 270" in the event that
some of its states do not gel as the race draws to a
close. Campaigns look to "expand the map," playing in
states where, if things align properly, a win is
possible. Democrats made serious play in Arizona from
the outset, and in Georgia later on, while Trump made a
major effort to win Minnesota. One can also think of
"expanding the paths to 270." The Biden campaign had a
number of possible paths to victory, while the Trump
campaign had a relatively narrow set of options and could
not open other paths due its more limited resources.
See: Battleground
States
Base Voters, Mobilizable
Voters and Undecided Voters
Once a campaign has decided it will contest a particular state, it does not blindly throw resources in. In presidential elections a significant share who turn out will vote for the Republican candidate no matter what and another significant share will vote for the Democrat no matter what. However, while some voters reliably turn out election after election, there are also voters who are clearly partisan in their leanings but do not turn out every election; they need extra motivation and attention. Campaigns have increasingly come to focus on this group, called variously mobilizable, low propensity, low engagement or infrequent voters. Using data and analytics, modeling and micro-targeting, the campaigns can identify these voters and try to motivate them to turn out. Finally, there are the undecided or persuadable voters. The idea is that with the right message the campaign can persuade these voters to support the candidate. Persuadable voters have assumed somewhat mythic status; in Oct. 2012 Slate asked "Dear Undecided Voter: Do You Exist?"
 |
|
| For a campaign, the electorate can be
divided into several groups: (1) the base, who
are for the candidate almost automatically; (2)
mobilizable, low propensity or low engagement
voters who need more attention; (3) undecided
voters who can be persuaded by the right
message; (4) the opposition, who will turn out
against the candidate; and (5) the quiescent
opposition, who will turn out against the
candidate if sufficienty riled up. In the
fall, much of the campaign's resources are
directed to groups 2 and 3. Then, in the
closing weeks, the campaign makes a substantial
effort to mobilize its base supporters (group
1). |
Presidential campaigns have grown
increasingly sophisticated. The Obama re-election
campaign in 2011-12 set the standard for a data-driven
campaign; campaign manager Jim Messina placed a major
emphasis on metrics. "This campaign has to be metric
driven. We're going to measure every single thing in
this campaign," he stated in an April 2011 campaign
video. The campaign was constantly modeling and
testing. Will this message work with low engagement
voters? Is this person likely to donate? To
volunteer? The reason for this approach was
simple. Data allows the campaign to use its time and
money more wisely. Although the Trump campaign
in 2016 was not well organized in many aspects, its data and
social media effort proved the key to his success (>).
At
the same time, the experience of the 2016 Clinton campaign
provides a cautionary note on the limitations of data and
analytics. In a Nov. 9 article, The Washington Post's
John Wagner provided an overview of Ada, a computer
algorithm that "was said to play a role in virtually every
strategic decision Clinton aides made" (>).
People in targeted areas and groups can expect to see the
candidates themselves, a lot of political ads and other
campaign communications, and they may find a campaign office
close by. Campaigns also tailor their messages to
specific constituencies through coalition or outreach
efforts, seeking to connect to women, Hispanics, youth and
so forth. Further into the fall newspapers start
making endorsements, and the campaigns make sure to
highlight those.
Campaigns must consider not only where and how but when
they will disburse their resources. Due to increased
early and absentee voting, there is not just one "Election
Day." The beginning of early voting in those states
that have it and, later, the approach of Election Day prompt
the campaigns to redouble their efforts to mobilize
supporters. Phone-banking, precinct-walking, instant
messaging and targeted messages on social media are staples
of get-out-the-vote (GOTV) efforts.
Candidate and Surrogate
Travel
The candidates' time is one of the most
important resources a campaign has. Campaign stops are
scheduled in media markets with high concentrations of
mobilizable or persuadable voters. They range from
rallies, roundtables and speeches to unnanounced or
off-the-record stops. In addition to the candidates
themselves, a wide variety of surrogates trek through,
ranging from family members to political figures to minor
celebrities.
| Aug. | Sept. | Oct. | Nov. | By State |
||
| President
Donald J. Trump |
x | >> | ||||
| Vice President Mike Pence | x | >> | ||||
| Former Vice President Joe Biden | ||||||
| Sen. Kamala
Harris |
||||||
| Rationale,
Methodology and Limitations |
map |
In the Fall Democratic presidential campaigns
have traditionally featured a massive ground game with
numerous field offices, field organizers, and volunteer
neighborhood team leaders, which significantly outmatches
the organization on the Republican side. For 2020,
Democrats have radically adjusted that model due to the
pandemic. Meanwhile, the Trump campaign and the RNC
have have built their organization in close cooperation over
about a year and a half, and are achieving record numbers of
voter contacts. Of course, it is not just quantity but
quality that matters, but person-to-person contacts are
effective and it is a truism voters like to be asked for
their vote.
[On a technical note, the field organization
on the ground in a given state is typically carried out by a
coordinated campaign or Victory campaign which is funded by
the state party and the national party and seeks to elect
party officials up and down the ticket].
Much of the money raised by the campaigns
goes into paid media, particularly television
advertising. Traditionally campaigns have put
together ad teams which includes both political and Madison
Avenue talent. (In 2020 the Biden campaign was
distinctive in keeping its paid media operation in
house). Based on polling data, the themes the campaign
wants to stress will have been identified. The ad team
generates ideas to convey those themes, and produces spots
which are then tested in focus groups, and, hopefully,
approved by the campaign management. However, the work
does not stop with an ad "in the can" and approved; careful
planning is required to ensure that the ads are seen by the
target audience. The demographic watching "60 Minutes"
differs markedly from that watching "Judge Judy." It
is left to media planners, juggling GRPs and dayparts, to
put together ad buys. In addition to ads from
campaigns, super PACs and interest groups add their voices
to the mix.
The campaigns are also giving more and more attention and resources to advertising on Facebook and other social media and to online advertising. This can be a very effective way to reach specific demographic groups in specific areas or states, and because it is relatively inexpensive can allow for a more prolonged conversation with the targeted group. As with TV advertising, for online advertising digital ad buyers try to reserve premium spaces such as on popular news sites.
Radio is an effective way to reach some
audiences, for example during drive-time. Because of
its lower profile radio is sometimes used to deliver
negative messages. Persuasion mail and phone calls
also convey the campaigns' negative messages. Magazine
and newspaper
advertising can be very effective, but are not used
much.
See: Ad
Spending in the 2020 Presidential Campaign
While paid media has long drawn attention
because of the amount of resources devoted to it and because
it can be relatively easy to identify ("Paid for by...),
campaigns also strive for earned media and social media
buzz. Earned media means the campaign does an event
that makes the national news or the front page of the
newspaper or is picked up by a blogger. Through his
use of Twitter and the constant controversies surrounding
him, Trump excels in getting earned media.
Social media can be more effective than paid
media. If a friend or acquaintance sends you a message
saying, "Hey, look at this interesting graphic or video from
the X campaign," that is likely to have more impact than a
30-second spot glimpsed on the TV. The campaigns have
staff busy tweeting, posting on Facebook, developing
infographics and sending out emails. In the lead up to
the election campaigns also have volunteers sending out text
messages to people's cell phones. Unlike paid media,
the scope and effectiveness of these efforts is difficult
for outside observers to measure.
Although there is a system of federal funding
for the presidential general election, recent campaigns have
opted to forego federal funds so they can raise and spend
more money. (The general election grant, established
by the Federal Election Campaign Act, comes with a spending
limit; this started out at $20 million in 1974 and has been
adjusted for inflation since). Both the Trump and
Biden campaigns declined the general election grant.
The 2020 race was a record breaker. As
reported by the Center for Responsive Politics, through Nov.
23, Biden for President raised a total of $1.044 billion and
spent $1.043 billion while Donald J. Trump for
President, Inc. raised $774.0 million and spent $778.4
million. In-person fundraising events with well-heeled
donors have been a staple of the fall campaign, but due to
the pandemic the Biden campaign shifted to virtual
fundraisers and still was able to raise record amounts.
In addition to the money raised and
spent by the campaigns, the national parties are allowed to
spend a fixed amount advocating the election of their
nominees (the limit for coordinated party expenditures in
2020 was $26.5 million). The parties are also free to
make independent expenditures supportive of their
nominees.
The campaigns and the parties are not the
only players on the field. Super PACs and other
outside groups spend tens of millions of dollars, mostly
attacking the opposing candidate. According to the Center
for Responsive Politics, through Nov. 9 outside groups
supporting Trump spent $316.7 million led by America First
Action at $149.1 million, while groups supporting Biden
spent $568.5 million led by Future Forward USA at $150.6
million and Priorities USA Action at $137.0 million (>).
It is interesting to consider how this
campaign would have turned out had there not been a
pandemic. So much of the Biden campaign message
focused on Trump's mishandling of the pandemic. At the
same time, the pandemic torpedoed the Trump campaign's
strategy of touting the strong economy. The candidates
and their campaigns responded very differently to the
pandemic. President Trump seemed unable to acknowledge
the loss of life and suffering, while Joe Biden was the
empathy candidate. While Trump and his campaign
flouted social distancing guidelines and recommendations by
holding large rallies, Biden and his campaign responded with
caution, holding contrived events with very limited
access. Pandemic instituted innovations such as drive
in rallies and use of painted circles or hula hoops to
ensure social distancing are not likely to be featured in
future campaigns, but other changes such as more of an
emphasis on virtual fundraising could endure.
