Select Committee Rather than Independent Outside Commission will Investigate Jan. 6 Attack on the U.S. Capitol

On May 19, the U.S. House passed H.R. 3233 to establish an outside commission by a vote of 252-175.  However, on May 28 the bill failed on a cloture vote in the U.S. Senate by 54-33.  On June 30, the U.S. House passed H.Res. 503 establishing a select committee by a vote of 222-190.
Speaker Nancy Pelosi
JULY 1, 2021 PRESS RELEASE

Pelosi Names Members to Select Committee to Investigate January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol

Washington, D.C. – Speaker Nancy Pelosi today named her appointments to a bipartisan Select Committee to examine and report upon the facts and causes relating to the terrorist mob attack on the United States Capitol Complex on January 6th, 2021.

“January 6th was one of the darkest days in our nation’s history, with five people killed, 140 members of law enforcement physically harmed and countless more seriously traumatized,” said Speaker Nancy Pelosi.  “It is clear that January 6th was not simply an attack on a building, but an attack on our very democracy: an attack on the peaceful transfer of power.  It is imperative that we find the truth of that day and ensure that such an assault on our Capitol and Democracy cannot ever again happen.”

“It had been our hope to establish a bipartisan, independent National Commission, but there is no prospect for that Commission at this time,” continued Speaker Pelosi.  “Yesterday, the House established the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol.  Today, I am proud to name Members who will patriotically honor our oath and our responsibility to the American people: to seek the truth.”

The Members of the Committee are:

Chair Bennie Thompson: Chair of Homeland Security Committee
Chair Zoe Lofgren: Chair of Committee on House Administration
Chair Adam Schiff: Chair of House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
Rep. Pete Aguilar, House Administration and Appropriations Committees
Rep. Liz Cheney, Armed Services Committee
Rep. Stephanie Murphy, Armed Services Committee
Rep. Jamie Raskin, Oversight and Judiciary Committees
Rep. Elaine Luria, Navy veteran, Armed Services and Homeland Security Committees
The Select Committee on the January 6th Insurrection will investigate and report upon the facts and causes of the terrorist mob attack on the United States Capitol on January 6th, 2021.  It will also be charged with reporting its findings, conclusions and recommendations for preventing future attacks.  The Committee will be bipartisan, with thirteen members appointed by the Speaker, five of whom will be appointed after consultation with the Minority Leader.

“As we enter the Fourth of July weekend to observe the birth of our nation, we do so with increased responsibility to honor the vision of our Founders and to defend our American Democracy.

Speaker Nancy Pelosi

JUNE 30, 2021 PRESS RELEASE

Floor Speech on H.Res. 503, Establishing the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol

Washington, D.C. – Speaker Nancy Pelosi delivered remarks on the Floor of the House of Representatives in support of H.Res. 503, which empowers Congress to find the truth of the January 6th insurrection at the United States Capitol and ensure that such an assault on democracy does not happen again.  Below are the Speaker’s remarks:

Speaker Pelosi.  Thank you, Madam Speaker.  I thank the gentleman for yielding and for his leadership in bringing this important resolution – legislation to the Floor.  I thank our distinguished Majority Leader for his clarity in presenting the case for this legislation and all of our colleagues who have come to the Floor on the Democratic side in the search of truth, justice, security for our country.

I particularly thank Mr. McGovern, because on the night of this insurrection, I was in the chair.  The security came and pulled me out.  He took the chair.  He risked his life to take the chair as the assaulters of our Capitol were out to get me for the bullet in the head or to hang the Vice President of the United States, assault the lives of Members of Congress, traumatize our staff, disrespect the workers in the Capitol.

Not an ‘ordinary tourist day in the Capitol,’ as the Republicans have characterized.  Republicans have characterized it as a ‘normal day’ in the Congress.  Well, we have pictures of those very same people pushing furniture up against the door to keep the intruders out.

We are under the dome of the Capitol.  A dome that was built by Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War.  When people said to him, ‘No, we need the steel, the this, the that, to fight the war,’ he said, ‘No.  We need to show our determination.’  To show our determination.

One year into the devastation of the Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln sent a message to Congress imploring Members to join as one to save the union.  ‘Fellow citizens,’ he said.  ‘We cannot escape history.  We of this Congress and this Administration will be remembered in spite of ourselves.  No personal significance or insignificance can spare one or another of us.  The fiery trial through which we pass will light us down in honor or dishonor to the latest generation.’

Madam Speaker, today we go on record.  We have – we, too, have a responsibility, as was described by President Lincoln.  We, too, cannot escape history.  We have a duty to the Constitution and to the American people to find the truth of January 6th and to ensure that such an assault on our democracy can never happen again.  And rather [than] being frivolous with the facts, we are going to be prayerful and patriotic and honor the concerns of the American people by seeking and finding the truth to protect our country from any future or similar assault.

As has been said many times, that day, January 6th, was one of the darkest days of our history.  For the Members, the police officers, the staff, the press, the support workers who were there, the memory of that day remains seared in our memory.   The sounds of glass shattering, officers fighting, rioters chanting.  The smell of tear gas and the taste of smoke in the air.  And the sight of people fleeing the Capitol or barricading doors, as Democrats and Republicans did that night.  And the sense of terror, hundreds of people fearing for their lives.

And the aftermath: over 140 members of law enforcement were physically and seriously harmed.  Five people died.  Staff, workers, press and Members were – and still remain – traumatized by the experience.

The sheer scale of the violence of that day is shocking.  But what is just as shocking is remembering why this violence occurred: to block the certification of an election and the peaceful transfer of power that is the cornerstone of our democracy.

It was a day actually required by – a date required by the Constitution.  It was not just ‘another tourist day in the Capitol.’  Congress returned to the Capitol that same night to accomplish our Constitutional duty.  That same night, thanks to the workers, the maintenance people here, the Capitol Police and the rest, we were able to return and send a message to the world that this Congress would honor its Constitutional duties, regardless of the assault that was made on it.

This was important, and it was bipartisan in the decision.  Right, Steny, you were there.  Mr. McConnell agreed that we would come back while others were saying, ‘go to an undisclosed location.’  We said, ‘No, we are going to the Capitol.’  Congress returns to the Capitol, as I said, to honor that responsibility.

We showed the insurrectionists and the country and the world that we would not be diverted from our duty.  We could do that because – we could do that because of the courage of the Capitol Police and the Metropolitan Police and other law enforcement, some of whom are with us today.  Thank you so much.  I especially want to recognize Gladys Sicknick, mother of Brian, who gave his life, and Sandra Garza, his friend and partner.

But it's clear that January 6th was not simply an attack on the Capitol building – it was an attack on our democracy.  Every Member here knows that January 6th was an attempt to subvert our democracy, but many across the aisle refuse to admit the truth.

They refuse to admit the truth when they voted against certifying the President – President Biden’s election that night, they refused to admit the truth when they voted against the creating of a bipartisan Commission to investigate the attack.  They refused to admit the truth when they called that day a ‘normal tourist visit.’  And today, when they – many will vote against establishing a Select Committee to investigate that day, they will again refuse to admit this truth.

But they did that.  100 percent of them voted ‘No’ against putting resources for the – to ensure the security of our Capitol Police and the security of this building.  One hundred and seventy-five Republicans voted ‘No.’  When it came time for the Commission, when it came time for the Commission, 35 yeses on the Republican side.

I'm heartbroken that we don't have the bipartisan Commission.  We yielded on every point: numbers, as Mr. Hoyer said, the numbers, the process for subpoenas, the timing – and further yielded on the Senate side on timing again, as well as clarification on staffing.  That was never in doubt, but they wanted further clarification.  They thought – the Republican Senators thought that they could win the day over there.  They thought they could.  And they thought they had the votes until the Majority – Minority – the newly Minority Leader of the Senate, Mitch McConnell, asked them to do him a ‘personal favor’ and vote against the Commission.

Too many of them chose to do Mitch McConnell a personal favor, rather than to perform their patriotic duty.  And hence, despite the fact that seven Republican Members either voted or said they would vote for the Commission, it was defeated.  They said, ‘Give us another week, give us another week, give us another week, give us another week.’  Now it's almost – well, it's four and a half weeks, and we must go forward.  It does not appear at this time that we can have a bipartisan Commission – outside Commission.  Hopefully, that could still happen, but in the meantime, we will have a Select Committee.

This is not unlike what happened in 2001 at the time of the 9/11 Commission.  9/11 happened exactly then: 9/11/2001.  It took almost – more than one year to get the Commission.  It was signed into law by the President on November 27, 2002.  In the meantime, there was a Congressional investigation, which was useful to the Commission when they finally were formed.  So, perhaps we can still hope for that, but we cannot wait for it.  To do that, we believed that Congress must, in the spirit of bipartisanship and patriotism, establish this Commission.  And it will be conducted with dignity, with patriotism, with respect for the American people so that they can know the truth.

It's a funny thing about Mitch saying he wanted them to do him a personal favor.  Oh, my goodness.  We had a Commission on this side of the Capitol.  Bennie Thompson, our distinguished Chair of the Homeland Security Committee, working with the Ranking Member of the Committee, Mr. Katko, put together a bipartisan Commission.

Only 35 Republicans voted for it, even though we responded to every one of their concerns.  Except, as Mr. Hoyer said, ‘scope.’  Scope.  They just did not want to go to the truth, sadly.

That is why there will be, and today we are establishing, a Select Committee on the January 6th Insurrection.  It will investigate and report upon the facts and causes of the attack.  It will report on conclusions and recommendations for preventing any future assault, and it will find the truth, which clearly the Republicans fear – but hopefully not across the country.

This Committee is about our security, ensuring that a future attack does not happen, and it's about patriotism and democracy, ensuring that Congress can continue to serve the American people.  Mr. Hoyer rightfully pointed out that, as the other side likes to say, ‘Oh, the Senate. They did a bipartisan’ – they were very limited in what they were allowed to do.  They were only allowed to investigate the security of the building, not the causes of it, not the fact that it was an insurrection incited by the Executive Branch.  None of that was allowed, so don't use that as an excuse not to have a fuller investigation of the underlying causes of what happened.  The underlying causes of white supremist and antisemit – antisemites.  One man with a Camp Auschwitz shirt on: ‘six million are not enough.’  You think they would reject that.  No, it’s just a ‘normal day of tourism in the Capitol.’

In that message to the Congress that I quoted in the beginning from President Lincoln, he concluded by declaring, ‘We shall nobly save or meanly lose the last best hope of Earth.  The way is plain, peaceful, generous, just.  A way, which if followed, the world will forever applaud, and God must forever bless.’  He went on to say, ‘We know how to save the Union, the world knows how – we do know how to save it.  We hold t.he power,’ he said and ‘bear the responsibility.’

Today, we, too, hold the power and bear the responsibility.  Let all Members do what is right and vote for this legislation.  We will be judged by future generations as to how we value our democracy.  Let's be on the right side – not only of history, but the right side of the future.  I urge my colleagues to vote ‘aye’ and yield back the balance of my time.



H. RES. 503

Establishing the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol.


IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
June 28, 2021

Ms. Pelosi submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Rules


RESOLUTION

Establishing the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol.

    Whereas January 6, 2021, was one of the darkest days of our democracy, during which insurrectionists attempted to impede Congress’s Constitutional mandate to validate the presidential election and launched an assault on the United States Capitol Complex that resulted in multiple deaths, physical harm to over 140 members of law enforcement, and terror and trauma among staff, institutional employees, press, and Members;

    Whereas, on January 27, 2021, the Department of Homeland Security issued a National Terrorism Advisory System Bulletin that due to the “heightened threat environment across the United States,” in which “[S]ome ideologically-motivated violent extremists with objections to the exercise of governmental authority and the presidential transition, as well as other perceived grievances fueled by false narratives, could continue to mobilize to incite or commit violence.” The Bulletin also stated that—

    (1) “DHS is concerned these same drivers to violence will remain through early 2021 and some DVEs [domestic violent extremists] may be emboldened by the January 6, 2021 breach of the U.S. Capitol Building in Washington, D.C. to target elected officials and government facilities.”; and

    (2) “Threats of violence against critical infrastructure, including the electric, telecommunications and healthcare sectors, increased in 2020 with violent extremists citing misinformation and conspiracy theories about COVID–19 for their actions”;

    Whereas, on September 24, 2020, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Christopher Wray testified before the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives that—

    (1) “[T]he underlying drivers for domestic violent extremism – such as perceptions of government or law enforcement overreach, sociopolitical conditions, racism, anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, misogyny, and reactions to legislative actions – remain constant.”;

    (2) “[W]ithin the domestic terrorism bucket category as a whole, racially-motivated violent extremism is, I think, the biggest bucket within the larger group. And within the racially-motivated violent extremists bucket, people subscribing to some kind of white supremacist-type ideology is certainly the biggest chunk of that.”; and

    (3) “More deaths were caused by DVEs than international terrorists in recent years. In fact, 2019 was the deadliest year for domestic extremist violence since the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995”; 

    Whereas, on April 15, 2021, Michael Bolton, the Inspector General for the United States Capitol Police, testified to the Committee on House Administration of the House of Representatives that—

    (1) “The Department lacked adequate guidance for operational planning. USCP did not have policy and procedures in place that communicated which personnel were responsible for operational planning, what type of operational planning documents its personnel should prepare, nor when its personnel should prepare operational planning documents.”; and

    (2) “USCP failed to disseminate relevant information obtained from outside sources, lacked consensus on interpretation of threat analyses, and disseminated conflicting intelligence information regarding planned events for January 6, 2021.”; and

    Whereas the security leadership of the Congress under-prepared for the events of January 6th, with United States Capitol Police Inspector General Michael Bolton testifying again on June 15, 2021, that—

    (1) “USCP did not have adequate policies and procedures for FRU (First Responder Unit) defining its overall operations. Additionally, FRU lacked resources and training for properly completing its mission.”;

    (2) “The Department did not have adequate policies and procedures for securing ballistic helmets and vests strategically stored around the Capitol Complex.”; and

    (3) “FRU did not have the proper resources to complete its mission.”: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, 

SECTION 1. ESTABLISHMENT.

There is hereby established the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (hereinafter referred to as the “Select Committee”).

SEC. 2. COMPOSITION.

(a) Appointment Of Members.—The Speaker shall appoint 13 Members to the Select Committee, 5 of whom shall be appointed after consultation with the minority leader.

(b) Designation Of Chair.—The Speaker shall designate one Member to serve as chair of the Select Committee.

(c) Vacancies.—Any vacancy in the Select Committee shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment.

SEC. 3. PURPOSES.

Consistent with the functions described in section 4, the purposes of the Select Committee are the following:

(1) To investigate and report upon the facts, circumstances, and causes relating to the January 6, 2021, domestic terrorist attack upon the United States Capitol Complex (hereafter referred to as the “domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol”) and relating to the interference with the peaceful transfer of power, including facts and causes relating to the preparedness and response of the United States Capitol Police and other Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies in the National Capital Region and other instrumentalities of government, as well as the influencing factors that fomented such an attack on American representative democracy while engaged in a constitutional process.

(2) To examine and evaluate evidence developed by relevant Federal, State, and local governmental agencies regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding the domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol and targeted violence and domestic terrorism relevant to such terrorist attack.

(3) To build upon the investigations of other entities and avoid unnecessary duplication of efforts by reviewing the investigations, findings, conclusions, and recommendations of other executive branch, congressional, or independent bipartisan or nonpartisan commission investigations into the domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol, including investigations into influencing factors related to such attack.

SEC. 4. FUNCTIONS.

(a) Functions.—The functions of the Select Committee are to—

(1) investigate the facts, circumstances, and causes relating to the domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol, including facts and circumstances relating to—

(A) activities of intelligence agencies, law enforcement agencies, and the Armed Forces, including with respect to intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination and information sharing among the branches and other instrumentalities of government;

(B) influencing factors that contributed to the domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol and how technology, including online platforms, financing, and malign foreign influence operations and campaigns may have factored into the motivation, organization, and execution of the domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol; and

(C) other entities of the public and private sector as determined relevant by the Select Committee for such investigation;

(2) identify, review, and evaluate the causes of and the lessons learned from the domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol regarding—

(A) the command, control, and communications of the United States Capitol Police, the Armed Forces, the National Guard, the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia, and other Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies in the National Capital Region on or before January 6, 2021;

(B) the structure, coordination, operational plans, policies, and procedures of the Federal Government, including as such relate to State and local governments and nongovernmental entities, and particularly with respect to detecting, preventing, preparing for, and responding to targeted violence and domestic terrorism;

(C) the structure, authorities, training, manpower utilization, equipment, operational planning, and use of force policies of the United States Capitol Police;

(D) the policies, protocols, processes, procedures, and systems for the sharing of intelligence and other information by Federal, State, and local agencies with the United States Capitol Police, the Sergeants at Arms of the House of Representatives and Senate, the Government of the District of Columbia, including the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia, the National Guard, and other Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies in the National Capital Region on or before January 6, 2021, and the related policies, protocols, processes, procedures, and systems for monitoring, assessing, disseminating, and acting on intelligence and other information, including elevating the security posture of the United States Capitol Complex, derived from instrumentalities of government, open sources, and online platforms; and

(E) the policies, protocols, processes, procedures, and systems for interoperability between the United States Capitol Police and the National Guard, the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia, and other Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies in the National Capital Region on or before January 6, 2021; and

(3) issue a final report to the House containing such findings, conclusions, and recommendations for corrective measures described in subsection (c) as it may deem necessary.

(b) Reports.—

(1) INTERIM REPORTS.—In addition to the final report addressing the matters in subsection (a) and section 3, the Select Committee may report to the House or any committee of the House from time to time the results of its investigations, together with such detailed findings and legislative recommendations as it may deem advisable.

(2) TREATMENT OF CLASSIFIED OR LAW ENFORCEMENT-SENSITIVE MATTER.—Any report issued by the Select Committee shall be issued in unclassified form but may include a classified annex, a law enforcement-sensitive annex, or both.

(c) Corrective Measures Described.—The corrective measures described in this subsection may include changes in law, policy, procedures, rules, or regulations that could be taken—

(1) to prevent future acts of violence, domestic terrorism, and domestic violent extremism, including acts targeted at American democratic institutions;

(2) to improve the security posture of the United States Capitol Complex while preserving accessibility of the Capitol Complex for all Americans; and

(3) to strengthen the security and resilience of the United States and American democratic institutions against violence, domestic terrorism, and domestic violent extremism.

(d) No Markup Of Legislation Permitted.—The Select Committee may not hold a markup of legislation.

SEC. 5. PROCEDURE.

(a) Access To Information From Intelligence Community.—Notwithstanding clause 3(m) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Select Committee is authorized to study the sources and methods of entities described in clause 11(b)(1)(A) of rule X insofar as such study is related to the matters described in sections 3 and 4.

(b) Treatment Of Classified Information.—Clause 11(b)(4), clause 11(e), and the first sentence of clause 11(f) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives shall apply to the Select Committee.

(c) Applicability Of Rules Governing Procedures Of Committees.—Rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives shall apply to the Select Committee except as follows:

(1) Clause 2(a) of rule XI shall not apply to the Select Committee.

(2) Clause 2(g)(2)(D) of rule XI shall apply to the Select Committee in the same manner as it applies to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

(3) Pursuant to clause 2(h) of rule XI, two Members of the Select Committee shall constitute a quorum for taking testimony or receiving evidence and one-third of the Members of the Select Committee shall constitute a quorum for taking any action other than one for which the presence of a majority of the Select Committee is required.

(4) The chair of the Select Committee may authorize and issue subpoenas pursuant to clause 2(m) of rule XI in the investigation and study conducted pursuant to sections 3 and 4 of this resolution, including for the purpose of taking depositions.

(5) The chair of the Select Committee is authorized to compel by subpoena the furnishing of information by interrogatory.

(6) (A) The chair of the Select Committee, upon consultation with the ranking minority member, may order the taking of depositions, including pursuant to subpoena, by a Member or counsel of the Select Committee, in the same manner as a standing committee pursuant to section 3(b)(1) of House Resolution 8, One Hundred Seventeenth Congress.

(B) Depositions taken under the authority prescribed in this paragraph shall be governed by the procedures submitted by the chair of the Committee on Rules for printing in the Congressional Record on January 4, 2021.

(7) Subpoenas authorized pursuant to this resolution may be signed by the chair of the Select Committee or a designee.

(8) The chair of the Select Committee may, after consultation with the ranking minority member, recognize—

(A) Members of the Select Committee to question a witness for periods longer than five minutes as though pursuant to clause 2(j)(2)(B) of rule XI; and

(B) staff of the Select Committee to question a witness as though pursuant to clause 2(j)(2)(C) of rule XI.

(9) The chair of the Select Committee may postpone further proceedings when a record vote is ordered on questions referenced in clause 2(h)(4) of rule XI, and may resume proceedings on such postponed questions at any time after reasonable notice. Notwithstanding any intervening order for the previous question, an underlying proposition shall remain subject to further debate or amendment to the same extent as when the question was postponed.

(10) The provisions of paragraphs (f)(1) through (f)(12) of clause 4 of rule XI shall apply to the Select Committee.

SEC. 6. RECORDS; STAFF; TRAVEL; FUNDING.

(a) Sharing Records Of Committees.—Any committee of the House of Representatives having custody of records in any form relating to the matters described in sections 3 and 4 shall provide copies of such records to the Select Committee not later than 14 days of the adoption of this resolution or receipt of such records. Such records shall become the records of the Select Committee.

(b) Staff.—The appointment and the compensation of staff for the Select Committee shall be subject to regulations issued by the Committee on House Administration.

(c) Detail Of Staff Of Other Offices.—Staff of employing entities of the House or a joint committee may be detailed to the Select Committee to carry out this resolution and shall be deemed to be staff of the Select Committee.

(d) Use Of Consultants Permitted.—Section 202(i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (2 U.S.C. 4301(i)) shall apply with respect to the Select Committee in the same manner as such section applies with respect to a standing committee of the House of Representatives.

(e) Travel.—Clauses 8(a), (b), and (c) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives shall apply to the Select Committee.

(f) Funding; Payments.—There shall be paid out of the applicable accounts of the House of Representatives such sums as may be necessary for the expenses of the Select Committee. Such payments shall be made on vouchers signed by the chair of the Select Committee and approved in the manner directed by the Committee on House Administration. Amounts made available under this subsection shall be expended in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Committee on House Administration.

SEC. 7. TERMINATION AND DISPOSITION OF RECORDS.

(a) Termination.—The Select Committee shall terminate 30 days after filing the final report under section 4.

(b) Disposition Of Records.—Upon termination of the Select Committee—

(1) the records of the Select Committee shall become the records of such committee or committees designated by the Speaker; and

(2) the copies of records provided to the Select Committee by a committee of the House under section 6(a) shall be returned to the committee.



Majority Leader Chuck Schumer
May 24, 2021

Majority Leader Schumer Floor Remarks: Senate Will Vote On Bipartisan January 6th Commission; American People Will See Which Members Are On The Side Of Truth Vs. On The Side Of Donald Trump’s Big Lie

Washington, D.C. –  Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) today spoke on the Senate floor regarding the need to bring the House-passed legislation that would create an independent commission to investigate the events up to and including the January 6th insurrection up for a vote.
Senator Schumer also stressed that this legislation is crucial for maintaining our democracy and moving forwards as a country. Below are Senator Schumer’s remarks, which can also be viewed here:

The Senate will soon consider bipartisan legislation passed by the House to create an independent commission to investigate and report on the January 6th attack on the Capitol.

I have already taken procedural steps to make the legislation available for consideration on the Senate floor. I will bring the bill forward for a vote, very soon. I will have more to say on that in the coming days.

The formation of a commission is more important now that it ever has been. In the months since January 6th, Washington Republicans have tried to re-write history and re-cast the attack on January 6th as little more than a peaceful protests that got out of hand.

One Republican member said the rioters were more like a group of “normal tourists.” Did you see the tapes? Did you see the films, America? Those were normal tourists?

Another went so far as to say the mob—not the staff who were terrorized, or the police who were brutalized—were the real victims on January 6th. Give me a break.

For the sake of our democracy, it is crucial to establish an independent and trusted record of what really transpired. According to an Ipsos poll today, 56% of Republicans believe that the election was rigged and 53% of Republicans believe that Donald Trump is the true president, not Joe Biden.

That’s what the Big Lie has caused: the majority of one of America’s two major political parties doesn’t believe our president is the actual president.

Now more than ever, both parties must to stand up to the Big Lie and shine a light on the truth of the 2020 elections and what happened on January 6th.

And yet it seems our Republican colleagues would rather avoid the subject entirely. The Republican Leader, after moving the goalposts week after week, announced his opposition to the commission despite the fact that Democrats agreed to every single request made by the House Republican Leader.

One Republican Senator said this weekend that it was “too early” to establish a commission. Another admitted that many Republicans opposed the commission because they feared it would hurt the Republican message in the midterm elections. Talk about saying the quiet part out loud.

The prevailing view among Republicans seems to be that we should sweep the Big Lie and all of January 6th under the rug, like it never happened.

Look, I’m sorry that some Republicans believe that a bipartisan investigation of the attack on our democracy is inconvenient for their midterm campaigns.
But the Democratic-led Congress of the United States is not going to sweep January 6th under the rug.

We are going to vote on the January 6th Commission in the Senate, and the American people will see where every member stands: on the side of truth, or on the side of Donald Trump’s Big Lie.

 ###

Republican Leader Mitch McConnell
May 27, 2021

  McConnell Strongly Supports January 6th Investigations, Opposes Extra Commission

‘As my colleagues know, I have been clear and unflinching in my own statements about January the 6th. But, as I’ve also repeated, there is no new fact about that day that we need the Democrats’ extraneous “commission” to uncover.’

WASHINGTON, D.C. – U.S. Senate Republican Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) delivered the following remarks today on the Senate floor regarding the January 6th commission:

“As my colleagues know, I have been clear and unflinching in my own statements about January the 6th. But, as I’ve also repeated, there is no new fact about that day that we need the Democrats’ extraneous ‘commission’ to uncover.

“The Department of Justice is deep into a massive criminal investigation. 440-plus people have already been arrested. Hundreds have been charged. Even more arrests are said to be planned. And the Attorney General indicates this investigation will remain a focus.

“Multiple Senate committees are conducting their own bipartisan inquiries.

“And obviously, the role of the former President has already been litigated exhaustively in the high-profile impeachment trial several months ago.

“I do not believe the additional, extraneous “commission” that Democratic leaders want would uncover crucial new facts or promote healing. Frankly, I do not believe it is even designed to.

“That’s why the Speaker’s first draft began with a laughably rigged and partisan starting point, and why the current language would still lock in significant unfairness under the hood.

“So I’ll continue to support the real, serious work of our criminal justice system and our own Senate committees. And I’ll continue to urge my colleagues to oppose this extraneous layer when the time comes for the Senate to vote.”

H. R. 3233

To establish the National Commission to Investigate the January 6 Attack on the United States Capitol Complex, and for other purposes.


IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
May 19, 2021

Received; read the first time

May 20, 2021

Read the second time and placed on the calendar


AN ACT

To establish the National Commission to Investigate the January 6 Attack on the United States Capitol Complex, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “National Commission to Investigate the January 6 Attack on the United States Capitol Complex Act”.

SEC. 2. ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMISSION.

There is established in the legislative branch the National Commission to Investigate the January 6 Attack on the United States Capitol Complex (hereafter referred to as the “Commission”).

SEC. 3. PURPOSES.

Consistent with the functions described in section 4, the purposes of the Commission are the following:

(1) To investigate and report upon the facts and causes relating to the January 6, 2021, domestic terrorist attack upon the United States Capitol Complex (hereafter referred to as the “domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol”) and relating to the interference with the peaceful transfer of power, including facts and causes relating to the preparedness and response of the United States Capitol Police and other Federal, State, and local law enforcement in the National Capitol Region and other instrumentality of government, as well as the influencing factors that fomented such attack on American representative democracy while engaged in a constitutional process.

(2) To examine and evaluate evidence developed by relevant Federal, State, and local governmental agencies, in a manner that is respectful of ongoing law enforcement activities and investigations regarding the domestic terrorist attack upon the Capitol, regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding such terrorist attack and targeted violence and domestic terrorism relevant to such terrorist attack.

(3) To build upon the investigations of other entities and avoid unnecessary duplication by reviewing the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of other executive branch, congressional, or independent bipartisan or non-partisan commission investigations into the domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol and targeted violence and domestic terrorism relevant to such terrorist attack, including investigations into influencing factors related to such terrorist attack.

(4) To investigate and report to the President and Congress on its findings, conclusions, and recommendations for corrective measures that may include changes in law, policy, procedures, rules, or regulations that could be taken to prevent future acts of targeted violence and domestic terrorism, including to prevent domestic terrorist attacks against American democratic institutions, improve the security posture of the United States Capitol Complex while preserving accessibility of the Capitol Complex for all Americans, and strengthen the security and resilience of the Nation and American democratic institutions against domestic terrorism.

SEC. 4. FUNCTIONS OF COMMISSION.

The functions of the Commission are to—

(1) conduct an investigation of the relevant facts and circumstances relating to the domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol, including relevant facts and circumstances relating to—

(A) activities of intelligence agencies, law enforcement agencies, and the Armed Forces, including with respect to intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination and information sharing among relevant instrumentality of government;

(B) influencing factors that contributed to the domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol and how technology, including online platforms, financing, and malign foreign influence operations and campaigns may have factored into the motivation, organization, and execution of the domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol and targeted violence and domestic terrorism relevant to such attack; and

(C) other entities of the public and private sector as determined relevant by the Commission for such investigation;

(2) identify, review, and evaluate the causes of and the lessons learned from the domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol and targeted violence and domestic terrorism relevant to such attack regarding—

(A) the command, control, and communications of the United States Capitol Police, the National Guard, the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia, and other Federal, State, and local law enforcement in the National Capitol Region on or before January 6, 2021;

(B) the structure, coordination, operational plans, policies, and procedures of the Federal Government, including as such relate to State and local governments and nongovernmental entities, and particularly with respect to detecting, preventing, preparing for, and responding to targeted violence and domestic terrorism;

(C) the structure, authorities, training, manpower utilization, operational planning, and use of force policies of the United States Capitol Police;

(D) the policies, protocols, processes, procedures, and systems for sharing of intelligence and other information by Federal, State, and local agencies with the United States Capitol Police, the Sergeants at Arms of the House of Representatives and the Senate, the Government of the District of Columbia, including the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia, the National Guard, and other Federal, State, and local law enforcement in the National Capitol Region on or before January 6, 2021, and the related the policies, protocols, processes, procedures, and systems for monitoring, assessing, disseminating, and acting on intelligence and other information, including elevating the security posture of the United States Capitol Complex, derived from instrumentality of government, open sources, and online platforms; and

(E) the policies, protocols, processes, procedures, and systems for interoperability between the United States Capitol Police and the National Guard, the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia, and other Federal, State, and local law enforcement in the National Capitol Region on or before January 6, 2021; and

(3) submit to the President and Congress reports required pursuant to section 10 containing such findings, conclusions, and recommendations, which may include changes in law, policy, procedures, rules, or regulations, to improve the detection, prevention, preparedness for, and response to targeted violence and domestic terrorism and improve the security posture of the United States Capitol Complex and ensure the security of Members of Congress and staff.

SEC. 5. COMPOSITION OF COMMISSION.

(a) Members.—The Commission shall be composed of ten members, of whom—

(1) one member shall be appointed jointly by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the majority leader of the Senate to serve as Chairperson of the Commission;

(2) one member shall be appointed jointly by the minority leader of the House of Representatives and the minority leader of the Senate to serve as Vice Chairperson of the Commission;

(3) two members shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives;

(4) two members shall be appointed by the minority leader of the House of Representatives;

(5) two members shall be appointed by the majority leader of the Senate; and

(6) two members shall be appointed by the minority leader of the Senate.

(b) Qualifications; Initial Meeting.—

(1) NONGOVERNMENTAL APPOINTEES.—An individual appointed to the Commission may not be an officer or employee of an instrumentality of government.

(2) OTHER QUALIFICATIONS.—It is the sense of Congress that individuals appointed to the Commission should be prominent United States citizens, with national recognition and significant depth of experience in at least two of the following areas:

(A) Governmental service.

(B) Law enforcement.

(C) Civil rights, civil liberties, and privacy.

(D) The Armed Forces.

(E) Intelligence.

(F) Counterterrorism.

(G) Cybersecurity.

(H) Technology.

(I) Law.

(3) INITIAL MEETING.—The Commission shall meet and begin the initial operation of the Commission as soon as practicable, but not earlier than 15 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(c) Timing For Appointment.—All members of the Commission shall be appointed not later than 10 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(d) Quorum; Vacancies.—After its initial meeting, the Commission shall meet upon the call of the Chairperson or a majority of its members. A majority of members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum. Any vacancy in the Commission shall not affect its powers, but shall be promptly filled in the same manner in which the original appointment was made.

(e) Compensation.—Each member of the Commission may be compensated at not to exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay in effect for a position at level III of the Executive Schedule under section 5314 of title 5, United States Code, for each day during which that member is engaged in the actual performance of the duties of the Commission.

(f) Travel Expenses.—Each member of the Commission shall receive travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in accordance with applicable provision under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code.

SEC. 6. POWERS OF COMMISSION.

(a) In General.—

(1) HEARINGS AND EVIDENCE.—The Commission or, as delegated by the Chairperson and the Vice-Chairperson, any subcommittee or member thereof, may, for the purpose of carrying out this Act—

(A) hold such hearings and sit and act at such times and places, take such testimony, receive such evidence, and administer such oaths as the Commission or such designated subcommittee or designated member may determine advisable; and

(B) subject to paragraph (2)(A), require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence, memoranda, papers, or documents, or any other paper or electronic material, as the Commission or such designated subcommittee or designated member may determine advisable.

(2) SUBPOENAS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The Commission may issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of any evidence relating to any matter which the Commission is empowered to investigate under this Act. Such subpoenas shall be issued by agreement between the Chairperson and Vice Chairperson of the Commission, or by the vote of a majority of the members of the Commission. The attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence may be required from any place within the United States at any designated place of hearing within the United States.

(B) FAILURE TO OBEY A SUBPOENA.—If a person does not obey a subpoena issued under subparagraph (A), the Commission is authorized to apply to a United States district court for an order requiring that person to appear before the Commission to give testimony, produce evidence, or both, relating to the matter under investigation. The application may be made within the judicial district where the hearing is conducted or where that person is found, resides, or transacts business. Any failure to obey the order of the court may be punished by the court as a civil contempt.

(C) SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION.—The United States district court in which an action is brought under subparagraph (B) shall have original jurisdiction over any civil action brought by the Commission to enforce, secure a declaratory judgment concerning the validity of, or prevent a threatened refusal or failure to comply with, any subpoena issued by the Commission.

(D) SERVICE OF SUBPOENAS.—The subpoenas of the Commission shall be served in the manner provided for subpoenas issued by a United States district court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States district courts.

(E) SERVICE OF PROCESS.—All process of any court to which application is made under subparagraph (A) may be served in the judicial district in which the person required to be served resides or may be found.

(b) Contracting.—The Commission may, to such extent and in such amounts as are provided in appropriation Acts, enter into contracts to enable the Commission to discharge its duties under this Act.

(c) Obtaining Official Data.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Commission may secure directly from any Federal department or agency information, including any underlying information that may be in the possession of the intelligence community, that is necessary to enable it to carry out its purposes and functions under this Act. Upon request of the Chairperson, the chairperson of any subcommittee created by a majority of the Commission, or any member designated by a majority of the Commission, the head of such department or agency shall furnish such information to the Commission.

(2) RECEIPT, HANDLING, STORAGE, AND DISSEMINATION.—Information shall only be received, handled, stored, and disseminated by members of the Commission and its staff consistent with all applicable statutes, regulations, and Executive orders.

(d) Assistance From Federal Agencies.—

(1) GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION.—Upon the request of the Commission, the Administrator of General Services shall provide to the Commission, on a reimbursable basis, the administrative support services and office space necessary for the Commission to carry out its purposes and functions under this Act.

(2) OTHER FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES.—In addition to the assistance prescribed in paragraph (1), Federal departments and agencies may provide to the Commission such services, funds, facilities, staff, and other support services as determined advisable and authorized by law.

(e) Conveyances And Other Devises.—The Commission may accept, use, and dispose of devises of services or property, both real and personal, for the purpose of aiding or facilitating the work of the Commission.

(f) Postal Services.—The Commission may use the United States mail in the same manner and under the same conditions as Federal departments and agencies.

SEC. 7. STAFF OF COMMISSION.

(a) Appointment.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in paragraph (2), the Chairperson, in consultation with the Vice-Chairperson, in accordance with rules agreed upon by the Commission, may appoint and fix the compensation of a Staff Director and such other personnel as may be necessary to enable the Commission to carry out its purposes and functions, without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates, except that no rate of pay fixed under this subsection may exceed the equivalent of that payable for a position at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code.

(2) PERSONNEL AS FEDERAL EMPLOYEES.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 (18 U.S.C. 1301 et seq.)—

(i) the Commission shall be considered an employing office; and

(ii) the personnel of the Commission shall be considered covered employees.

(B) MEMBERS OF COMMISSION.—Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to apply to members of the Commission.

(b) Experts And Consultants.—The Commission is authorized to procure temporary and intermittent services under section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, but at rates for individuals not to exceed the daily equivalent of the maximum annual rate of basic pay under level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code.

(c) Detailees.—The head of any Federal department or agency may detail, on a non-reimbursable basis, any of the personnel of that department or agency to the Commission to assist the Commission in carrying out its purposes and functions.

SEC. 8. SECURITY CLEARANCES FOR MEMBERS AND STAFF.

The appropriate Federal departments or agencies shall cooperate with the Commission in expeditiously providing to the Commission members and staff appropriate security clearances to the extent possible pursuant to existing procedures and requirements, except that no person may be provided with access to classified information under this Act without the appropriate security clearances.

SEC. 9. NONAPPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT.

(a) In General.—The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not apply to the Commission.

(b) Public Meetings And Release Of Public Versions Of Reports.—The Commission shall—

(1) hold public hearings and meetings to the extent appropriate; and

(2) release public versions of the reports submitted pursuant to section 10.

(c) Conduct Of Public Hearings.—Any public hearings of the Commission shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the protection of information provided to or developed for or by the Commission as required by any applicable statute, regulation, or Executive order.

SEC. 10. REPORTS; TERMINATION.

(a) Interim Reports.—The Commission may submit to the President and Congress interim reports containing such findings, conclusions, and recommendations for corrective measures as have been agreed to by a majority of Commission members.

(b) Final Report.—Not later than December 31, 2021, the Commission shall submit to the President and Congress a final report containing such findings, conclusions, and recommendations for corrective measures as have been agreed to by a majority of Commission members.

(c) Termination.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Commission, and all the authorities of this Act, shall terminate upon the expiration of the 60-day period which begins on the date on which the Commission submits the final report under subsection (b).

(2) ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIVITIES BEFORE TERMINATION.—The Commission may use the 60-day period referred to in paragraph (1) for the purpose of concluding its activities, including providing testimony to committees of Congress concerning its reports and disseminating the final report.

SEC. 11. ARCHIVING.

The records of the Commission shall be transferred to the Center for Legislative Archives at the National Archives and Records Administration upon termination of the Commission pursuant to paragraph (1) of section 10(c).

SEC. 12. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

(a) In General.—There is authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this Act.

(b) Availability Of Funds.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorization under this section shall remain available until expended.

SEC. 13. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) DOMESTIC TERRORISM.—The term “domestic terrorism” has the meaning given such term in section 2331 of title 18, United States Code.

(2) INSTRUMENTALITY OF GOVERNMENT.—The term “instrumentality of government” means Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial agencies.

(3) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The term “intelligence community” has the meaning given such term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).

(4) MALIGN FOREIGN INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND CAMPAIGNS.—The term “malign foreign influence operations and campaigns” has the meaning given such term in section 101(h) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021(h)).

(5) TARGETED VIOLENCE.—The term “targeted violence” means an incident of violence in which an attacker selected a particular target in order to inflict mass injury or death with no discernable political or ideological motivation beyond mass injury or death.

Passed the House of Representatives May 19, 2021.

Attest:

Clerk